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Abstract: 
 
Purpose - The purpose of the current article is to provide an account of the financial crimes that are commit-
ted within the football clubs in Greece. 
 
Design/methodology/approach - First, ethnographic research with two football clubs in Greece was con-
ducted. Additional information on the issues at stake was obtained through interviews with informed actors 
from the realm of Greek football. Moreover, the telephone conversations that were available as the result of 
wiretapping by the Greek National Intelligence Agency, in relation to the latest football match-fixing scandal 
(2011) were used. Finally, published media sources were used. These provided information not only on the 
process behind financial crimes within football clubs but also on the key actors involved. 
 
Findings - A number of financial (and finance-related) crimes committed within football clubs were identified 
in the study. These include: ticket "tricks", fake tax certificates, crimes related to the players' salary pay-
ments, owing money, money laundering and match-fixing. Issues around financial crimes within football 
clubs must be located within the overall football-related context in the country, which is, of course, an exten-
sion of the general financial, entrepreneurial and political landscape in the country. 
 
Originality/value - This is the first article on football clubs and financial crimes in Greece. Although this is a 
case study from Greece, it constitutes a potential template for research on an international level. By using 
the case of football and football clubs in Greece, this article adds to understandings of the complexity of the 
broader motivational context of financial crime. 
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Introduction 
 
As the more popular sport in the world, football is a huge industry that is growing globally. According to 
Deloitte (2014), it is estimated that the turnover of the Big Five football leagues[1] only will exceed  EUR 
11.5bn in the 2014-2015 period. In addition to offering a legally neutral setting for schmoozing with respecta-
ble and risk-taking elites, the huge turnover in the football industry makes it extremely attractive to illicit en-
trepreneurs and to corruption, tax evasion and gaming malpractices, which threaten the actual and perceived 
integrity of the sport (for example, the bribery allegations against football's governing body, FIFA; Moore and 
Scannell, 2015). These practices and activities are very often associated with sinister, criminal "organisa-
tions" that are external to the world and industry of football and supposedly "invade" it to exploit it as much as 
possible. In media coverage, academic and other literature, footballmatch-fixing is often associated with hier-
archical "organised criminal organisations" with an international reach. For example, Ralf Mutschke, FIFA's 
head of security, suggests that "organised crime recently switched from drug trafficking to match-fixing" and 
that "the business of match manipulation is irresistibly attractive to international organised crime" (Mutschke, 
2013, pp. 9-10). 
Moreover, references to "mafias" infesting the world of football and using it as a money-making and money-
laundering platform are commonplace (Feltes, 2013; UNODC, 2013). As reported by Boniface et al. (2012, p. 
26 cited by Di Ronco and Lavorgna, 2014), generally speaking, "organised crime" seems to favour the most 
popular sports, which make it possible "to carry out underground criminal activities back-to-back with a posi-
tive public image, that of a sport with millions of supporters" (the so-called "image-laundering"). The UK soc-
cer clubs such as Glasgow Rangers, Leeds United and Portsmouth have been embroiled in takeover and 
financial scandals, involving domestic and foreign owners charged with serious offences, and there are 
heated issues about the role and denotation of "fit and proper" director requirements. 
The aim of the current article is to provide an account of the financial crimes that are committed within foot-
ball clubs in Greece. Among other, this article responds in a more structured manner to the lack of empirical 
studies on the issue internationally (with the exception of "match-fixing" in some contexts) and to Haberfeld 
and Sheehan's (2013) "hope" that new initiatives for the study of manifestations of sport-related crime issues 
in general are developed. Although this is a case study from Greece, it constitutes a potential template for 
research on an international level. By using the case of football and football clubs in Greece, what we try to 
do in this article is to add to understandings of the complexity of the broader motivational context of financial 
crime (for example, the works on fraud by Levi, 2008a, 2008b; Levi, 1999; Hollow, 2014), the information 
available about which (as well as the information on the impact or the actual threat financial crimes pose) is 
often "just a marketing hype" (Levi, 2011; Levi and Burrows, 2007). In the following sections we will present: 
 
   o     the methods and data used for the study; 
   o     the different manifestations or a typology of financial crimes committed within football 
clubs; and 
   o     a discussion of our findings by locating them within the contemporary football-related and 
non-football-related socio-economic situation in Greece and beyond. 
 
Data and methods 
 
The primary source of information for this article is ethnographic research that one of the authors of this arti-
cle conducted while being employed on a full-time basis in two football clubs in Greece. One of the clubs is 
one of the major and most popular clubs in country and part of the Super League (first division), whereas the 
other is a historic club in the second division (also known as "Football League" in Greece). The ethnographic 
work offered the researcher the opportunity to study individuals who seldom offer themselves for examination 
and a unique opportunity for exploration. This part of the research required immersion in the field for a signifi-
cant amount of time (from August 2008 to February 2011 and from April 2011 to April 2013) and participation 
in activities that were not related to the collection of data per se (Hobbs and Antonopoulos, 2014). Within the 
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context of the ethnographic research, additional information on the issues at stake was obtained through in-
terviews with informed actors from the realm of Greek football (e.g. individuals working within football clubs in 
the Greek Super League and Football League). 
Second, with regards to match-fixing in particular, we used the telephone conversations that were available 
as the result of wiretapping by the National Intelligence Agency (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion - EYP) in relation 
to the latest football match-fixing scandal (2011)[2]. These wiretapped conversations were able to offer abun-
dant information about the broad range of actors and groups involved and identify patterns of social organi-
sation across a number of cases many of which were related to one another. 
Finally, we collected, examined and analysed the published media sources which allowed us to obtain infor-
mation not only on the process behind financial crimes within football clubs but also on the key actors in-
volved. Articles from five newspapers were selected, namely, Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini, Ta Nea, To Proto 
Thema and To Vima from April 2010 to February 2015. The newspapers mentioned above were chosen for 
the particular research because they are non-sport[3] and non-tabloid newspapers that are circulated 
throughout the whole country. It was decided that only non-sport and non-tabloid newspapers would be used 
because there is a greater possibility for more informed accounts to be found in this type of newspapers. 
As with any study, the current study presents some limitations, which should be acknowledged at this stage. 
The first one has to do with the ethnographic part of the study. There can be no guarantee that the infor-
mation given is a wholly neutral representation of the activities and links between actors, though the re-
searcher attempted to make them as close to that as possible; one needs to remember that accounts offered 
in an ethnographic study are consciously or unconsciously interpreted by the researcher. Moreover, the data 
are limited to what the participants have provided and what has the researcher observed, and they cannot be 
generalised to the whole football scene. In relation to the interviews with the informed actors, there are is-
sues of generalizability, and one can never be absolutely certain about validity, although "cross-checking" 
and "member checking" significantly contributed towards eliminating untruthful accounts. In addition, there is 
also the issue of representativeness of the sample. In many instances, researchers used a method of snow-
balling sampling to identify participants, thus limiting the sample to the researcher's own personal network 
and, as a consequence, the scope of the findings (Levi, 2015). 
The second set of limitations is related to the wiretapped conversations by the Greek National Intelligence 
Agency. These are the result of law enforcement activity, which in turn is affected by resource restrictions, 
the competency of agents, organizational priorities and wider political priorities (Kinzig, 2004). As with any 
product of the state derived from largely unaccountable agencies, wiretapped conversations need to be care-
fully handled and the extent to which their revelations apply beyond the clubs affected remain uncertain. 
The final set of limitations is related to media sources. Most often, they not only refer to those cases which 
the authorities came across, thus not reporting "successful" schemes but also tend to present the issues re-
lating to the actors or the activity/ market itself in a sensational and morally charged manner. Nevertheless, 
we think that the methodological triangulation throughout the study - involving both official and "unofficial" 
sources - has created a net that has captured the most important aspects of the topic under investigation, 
and we believe and claim that there is a high degree of validity in the findings. 
 
Financial (and finance-related) crimes committed within football clubs 
 
Ticket tricks 
 
Match-day tickets are one of the main sources of income for football clubs, especially in divisions where TV 
rights and sponsorship agreements are not very lucrative (see Triandafyllou, 2012). As an income source, 
ticket sales of each club are taxed. This taxation process and calculation, however, bears some rather 
unique characteristics, which will be further analysed in this section. In football, and because of the rather 
complex taxation system, match-day tickets are not limited to the categories available on the stands around 
a football ground. On the contrary, an additional category of tickets, that most people do not have access to, 
is also issued - season tickets (Kathimerini, 2012). 
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Both match-day and season tickets are issued approximately ten days before each match. Their overall num-
ber is decided on a calculation of the number of people expected to attend the match for match-day tickets 
and on the number of people who bought season cards for the latter (season tickets). Overall, they represent 
the maximum capacity of spectators each match can have, a number that is then announced to and signed 
off first by the governing body of the league and then by both the local police and the tax service. 
The process through which these tickets are sold and how this sale is then reported is rather peculiar in 
Greek football. As far as the match tickets are concerned, the majority of the sales takes place a few hours 
before the match and consists of a transaction of money for a paper ticket, which will be then checked while 
entering the stadium by both the security staff and the league's "official auditors". The season tickets, how-
ever, are hardly ever exchanged as such. The common practice within the football industry is for the senior 
employees of the ticket office to arrange with both the security guards and the "official auditors" to let the 
season card holders enter the stadium, while keeping an account of their overall number (Kathimerini, 2012). 
After the match is over, the "auditors" would then inform the ticketing employees of the total number of sea-
son card holders who entered the stadium and the corresponding tickets would be destroyed, as if they were 
given to each season card holder individually. The overall number of both match day and season tickets 
would be then used to calculate the income generated by ticket sales on which the team will be taxed. 
What is described above is the ideal situation of this agreement between the employees and the auditors. 
However, common practices in Greek football tend to follow a different path (Eleftherotypia, 2014). Ticketing 
employees are often awarded the role of the "negotiator" in this agreement to convince the auditors to write 
down a number of season card holders who entered the stadium that is smaller than the actual number. This 
negotiation is "expected" by the auditors who often take pride in being "understanding" towards the club, es-
pecially when the overall attendance at a match is not high. The number agreed, which is substantially lower 
than the actual one, is then written on the official documentation of the match, which is signed by the auditor 
and communicated to the tax service, the local police and the governing body of the league, as well as the 
accounting department of the club which will then calculate tax liability. In one of the many occasions that 
one of us was present, as auditors claimed: 
 
 
[...] we understand the situation of the club, it's difficult to get people in, we know, but don't worry, I'm 
understanding [...] we had 210 (season card holders) in, how about we say 180? 
 
 
There have been occasions when the club could not issue an adequate number of match tickets because of 
miscalculations on behalf of the club or because of other financial problems within the club (lack of tax certifi-
cate - discussed below). In these occasions, the negotiation becomes more complex. The league's auditors 
are notified of the situation and a different approach in terms of transactions between the club and the fans is 
agreed. Even though, not having a paper ticket stamped by the Greek police and the tax service to provide to 
the individuals in exchange for the entry fee would automatically mean that there cannot be a transaction and 
thus the individual cannot be allowed in the stadium, this negotiation often results in an alternative solution. 
The auditors, sometimes encouraged by the league's administration itself, allow for "fake" or "impromptu" pa-
per tickets to be exchanged for money, permitting fans to enter the stadium unofficially, while officially sign-
ing the papers that say that because there are no official tickets for the matches, the number of entrants is 
zero. Again, as justified by the auditors in another instance: 
 
I wouldn't do it for others but since my boss (the president of the league) knows the X (club's presi-
dent), it's ok. But it's only for you. Don't tell anyone about it. Oh, make sure the president sends a posi-
tive review for my services though, he's friends with the Y (league's president name). 
 
Interestingly enough, this negotiation did not take place in a secret place behind closed doors. Often police-
men were present during this negotiation, observing without comment. 
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Fake tax certificates 
 
As discussed on the ticket sales tricks section, tickets are issued approximately ten days before each match, 
and, for the club to be eligible to sell them, the approval of both the police and the tax authorities is required. 
This approval process from tax authorities is rather lengthy and complex, forcing some clubs to outsource it 
to specialised accountants. The main element of the process, which has caused a number of issues in the 
past, is that for a club to get the approval for the tickets, a tax certificate is required, proving that the club's 
tax liabilities are settled. This certificate is issued monthly upon request and proves that either all tax liabili-
ties have been paid off or that a settlement has been made on any amount still owed (liability or fine) by the 
club (see Dimitropoulos, 2006). This certificate has to be presented by the club's employees in any dealing 
with the tax authorities. 
Securing this certificate, however, is not such an easy practice in modern Greek football. Unfortunately, foot-
ball clubs in all divisions are struggling to make ends meet, hindering their efforts to adhere to the agree-
ments made with the tax service. Even when clubs do make profits, they rarely adhere to the tax regulations. 
As sports academics have pointed out, Greek football clubs do not operate with a strategic long-term busi-
ness focus, which would include prioritising taxes (Dimitropoulos, 2010). On the contrary, a less structured 
short-term approach is adapted, which has impacted on the current poor economic state of the industry. 
Alternative methods are sometimes used to bypass the tax certificate. First of all, agreeing on a number of 
settlements can "buy" the club valuable time, notably the period of time between a new debt settlement and 
its lapse because of failure to comply. This short period (one or two months' window) can prove extremely 
useful for the club because it can allow the club to issue tickets for a number of matches using the same tax 
certificate, without paying any additional money from the overall debt owed. A second practice is the use of 
personal connections in the local tax service for the tax employees dealing with the club to allow for an ex-
ception to be made when approving the new tickets, without the required valid tax certificate. Because this 
practice was used rather often by local services in dealings with a number of companies, an online country-
wide filing system was gradually introduced, which, in combination with employees' relocations and tax ser-
vices restructurings, has created insuperable obstacles that are making this method increasingly difficult or 
even impossible to be followed (see Siomopoulos, 2013). 
The third practice often encountered in Greek football has attracted considerably more attention than the 
other two because it has also been used by a number of first division clubs that have faced charges and 
even relegation for their actions (Livanios, 2014). When a football club is unable to obtain a tax certificate be-
cause money owed to the tax authorities has not been paid, a fake tax certificate is created by the club and 
then presented to the tax service when requested. This fake tax certificate resembles the authentic one the 
club would have acquired otherwise, while using a fake protocol number to confuse the tax authorities' em-
ployees. The fake tax certificate is created by the employees of the club (usually the senior financial team) 
and is given to the employees dealing with tax with a script on how he or she should behave when approach-
ing the tax service. This preparation includes advice to "act natural", "pretend he/she does not know anything 
about it" and "call the president/owner should anything go wrong". Whether a senior male employee of the 
financial or ticketing department of the club or a novice, young male or female employee from a different de-
partment is selected for this purpose. Surprisingly enough, this practice has proven extremely successful in 
Greek football, with clubs securing approval for issuing tickets for a number of matches throughout the 
course of the majority of a season before being found out (Livanios, 2014). 
Finally, one of the most popular techniques applied in Greek football, which is usually used when all other 
practices fail, is the utilisation of personal political connections by the owner or the President of the club for 
the tax authorities to "turn a blind eye". As has been noted on numerous occasions, Greek politicians, and 
even the Government itself, are willing to help football clubs either in a direct or an indirect way and under 
any circumstances, especially when denying them could result in a severe political cost (see Dimitropoulos, 
2010). This last-resort practice is rarely spoken of in the clubs and can only take place a small number of 
times throughout each season for each club. But even during those few times, it is very likely that this prac-
tice can create tension between the tax authorities' officials and the club. 
As a last minute solution, there is often no time for appropriate planning, making this practice comprise of 
just three short phone calls. The first call is made by the employee of the club who, while dealing with the tax 
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service, was declined the request to approve the tickets, either for not having a certificate or for being in a 
possession of a fake one. This call is made directly to the president/owner of the club to whom what hap-
pened is described briefly. The employee is then instructed by the president/owner to wait at the tax service, 
while he tries to "fix the problem". The second call is made by the president/ owner to a personal connection 
of his, who is often a highly valued and well-known politician. Unfortunately, little information exists on these 
second phone calls because they usually take place through a private phone, using personal connections 
that are rarely available to the public or even the employees of the club. Additionally, little information exists 
on the politicians involved in this kind of phone call, regardless of various accusations that have occasionally 
been made by the Press (Polyhroniadis, 2011). The third phone call is then made by the above-mentioned 
politician directly to the director of the local tax service from whom the club's employee tries to get the ap-
proval. The phone call is made for the director of the service to be convinced to "turn a blind eye" and allow 
for the tickets to be signed and stamped because the request to do so comes from a well-know and highly 
respected politician. Once again, little information exists on the contents of this kind of phone calls; however, 
it is worth noting that the director might not always comply happily with the politician's request. A tax service 
director, shortly after this third phone call, was heard by one of the interviewees yelling at the club's em-
ployee: 
 
 
I'm being asked again to be your puppet. That's enough! I'll do it, because he leaves me with no 
choice. But tell your President that if he gets the fat one (referring to the politician) involved again, I'm 
going to start making phone calls too. I've had enough! 
Whether the tax official would in fact carry out that threat is unknown. 
 
Players' salary payments 
 
The football players are believed to be one of the most valuable assets a club possesses. The way in which 
they are treated, however, is rarely in accordance with this belief. Footballers sign lucrative contracts with 
football clubs in both professional divisions of Greek football; however, the number of players who actually 
get paid the amount of money agreed with the club in their contract is quite low. Using a number of tech-
niques, ranging from friendly requests to violent threats to convince players to be patient with their delayed 
salary payments, football clubs have avoided paying large sums of money over the past years. It is worth 
noting that a large number of professional players get by with small weekly payments of as low as EUR 50-
100, as a consolation prize for waiting for the delayed salaries. The process by which the players are con-
vinced tends to follow an interesting two-fold pattern. 
The owner or president of the club will often wait until the end of the last training session of the week to hand 
out this consolation money, while dealing with a number of complaints by the players. His response tends to 
be similar or identical to the following that was witnessed by the researcher: 
 
 
I am sorry guys, this is all I can do for now. Please be patient and I promise I'll pay you all back next 
week when this new sponsor (naming a random company) signs. 
 
When/if the footballers are not happy with his request for patience, his tone changes dramatically: 
 
Do you know how lucky you are you're playing for us? You think you're that special? I have a hundred 
players younger and more talented waiting for my call, begging for a chance to play. Here you get a 
chance to play, to show your talent. Scouters come to all matches; some are even shown on TV. 
Leave the club and there's no chance a scouter will be picking you. 
 
It is also worth noting that by the half of each season, the vast majority of the underpaid footballers will make 
an official request to "break" their contract and leave the club. However, leaving a club is not such an easy 
process. Threats of violence will often be made to convince the players to stay. For example, the president of 
one of the clubs the researcher worked for was once quoted saying that, "if you sign with them, my boys 
(bodyguards) will break your legs so bad, you won't be able to kick a ball ever again in your life". 
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It is not until a player is able to secure a contract with another club that an agreement, that was not honoured 
by the club in the first place, might be broken. In order for the contract to be broken, the footballer will be 
asked to sign an official document claiming that he received all his payments and has no further claims from 
the club, even though he had never (and will never) receive the money which was originally agreed on the 
contract. If the footballer refuses to sign this document, additional violent threats or actions might be made, 
often involving injuring him or damaging his property, while postponing the transfer agreement until the trans-
fer window is closed or the other clubs withdraw their offer. In other words, the player is extorted to write off 
the money owed by the club to continue with his career in another club. The club will then claim to the tax 
authorities that the player has been paid, increasing the claimed expenses made during that financial year[4]. 
While the above-mentioned practice might seem contradictory to the image of the superstar rich footballer 
often portrayed in the media, it is very common in Greek football. In fact, the way in which footballers are 
treated in modern Greek football is so unprofessional that it has led to numerous official complaints made to 
the international governing bodies of the sport that have in turn resulted in the International Federation of 
Professional Footballers (FIFPro) issuing an official announcement, consulting footballers, to avoid signing 
contracts with Greek clubs (FIFPro, 2013). This may not be an option for most Greek footballers. 
 
Owing money 
 
As presented in the previous section, football clubs' presidents/owners have a tendency to not pay money 
that is owed. This also applies in money owed to other employees of the clubs and suppliers of various 
goods and services. Presidents/owners try to make agreements that are not officially recorded, such as em-
ploying people without an official contract and buying goods and services without a receipt, so that a mini-
mum or no account of the money owed by the club is created. When the interested parties request the 
money they are entitled to, the president's responses once again range from friendly requests to violent 
threats, while asking the parties to be patient. Once again, the initial request resembles the polite one given 
to the footballers: 
 
 
I'm sorry I can't do anything now. You know how difficult the economy is. There is no company that 
pays in time now. But you know I'll pay you the moment I get the money, you're at the top of my list. 
 
As time passes and no or very little money is paid to the employees or suppliers who repeatedly ask for it, 
the president's tone changes, becoming increasingly more hostile: 
You think I don't know I owe you money? I know! But you are not my first priority. Am I the only one 
who is not paying? No. No company is paying now, look around you. Stop busting my balls or you 
won't be paid at all. 
 
Threatening employees and providers works for the majority of times, however, not all the time. Some em-
ployees, for example, have insisted on being paid the money they were owed and thought that approaching 
the president the moment they knew that he would have cash in his hands might make him change his mind. 
For example, after a football match, when the president is meeting the head of ticketing who presents him 
with the earnings of the match. This meeting would originally take place in the ticket office of the stadium or 
the club's main offices; however, when a number of individuals who were owed money found out about it and 
tried to approach him at these venues, another location was selected. In order for this location to remain un-
known to these individuals, often a cafeteria or a bar is selected by the president and is communicated via 
text to the head of ticketing right after the match was over. It is also worth noting that for the president to 
avoid being followed, he is often transported to this location hidden at the back of someone else's car. An 
additional anecdotal detail in this money drop is that for the full amount of earnings to be delivered without 
anyone noticing, the cash was often hidden in non-suspicious objects, notably the bottom of a plastic coffee 
holder, which was then handed to the president of the club by the head of ticketing. 
Based not only on the above-mentioned unsettled accounts but also on the overall profile of the individuals 
involved in football (further discussed in the following section), it is rather common, not only on a match-day 
but also on any weekday, for the presidents or owners of the clubs to either carry a gun themselves or be 
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accompanied by security personnel who carry guns. These guns are not usually fired but are used as an in-
timidation tactic, especially in tense situations, such as negotiating "breaking" a player's contract, and deal-
ings about money owed to employees or third parties. In numerous occasions in which the researcher was 
present, individuals casually placed their gun on top of the meeting table while sitting down to start a discus-
sion, without ever referring to it or threatening their interlocutors directly. 
 
Money laundering 
 
The individuals involved in the administration of Greek football nowadays are often very different to the indi-
viduals encountered in the administration of most European clubs. Even though the fit and proper test has 
been a law in the country since 1999, Law 2,725 of 1999 (Efimerida Kyverniseos, 1999), it has never been 
implemented, allowing for anyone to be involved in the sport, including a number of dubious businessmen 
who are often accused of various minor or major crimes, including financial fraud, and even face or have 
faced imprisonment in the past (To Vima, 2011, 2014). Surprisingly enough, individuals who have committed 
fraud in other football clubs and have even been banned from all Greek stadia are often "allowed" to be in-
volved directly or indirectly with other clubs. Their titles might vary from presidents to CEOs and general 
managers, however, as one of them put it when asked about his job, they see themselves as the "highest 
power" of the club ("geniko koumando" in Greek). 
Those individuals have often used football clubs as a money laundering mechanism, which facilitates them in 
declaring a substantial amount of income every year, an amount that does not attract the authorities' atten-
tion, while justifying an extravagant lifestyle and covering other possible illegal activities (Kathimerini, 2013). 
A number of these individuals have been actively involved in other activities, such as illegal betting, gun, 
drugs and oil illegal markets. However, because justifying their income from these activities would be ex-
tremely difficult, providing a legitimate account for this money through a football club appears to be an easier 
solution. Interestingly enough, some of these individuals appear to be avoiding legal implications for their ac-
tions, despite the media attention they might occasionally attract. Providing more specific information on 
these cases would require for individual presidents/owners to be profiled, which exceeds the aim of this pa-
per and will, therefore, not be attempted. 
In practical terms, however, as with any successful business, it would be rather costly to run a football club 
that appears to be earning money. Thus, a different method is being followed. "Fake" sponsorship agree-
ments appear unexpectedly a few weeks before the end of each financial year (Eleftherotypia, 2010). These 
agreements, often with companies owned by family members or friends of the owners of the clubs, are rather 
lucrative for the clubs, allowing them to present a very high income at the end of the season. Unfortunately, 
however, most of these agreements are cancelled or accounting-wise are being noted as money that will not 
be collected[5] (Zafeiropoulos, 2012) and are often written off after a few years. This cancellation or account-
ing trick takes place after the financial year is over and does not affect the earning claims the owner made for 
that particular year. It is only after an extensive auditor's check that this trick can be traced, and because au-
ditors' checks do not usually take place in Greek football, this method has been applied numerous times 
without any repercussions to the clubs' owners. The practicality of the whole process is that the owners get a 
legitimate cover for their income, while realistically not proving how and if the income was made. 
 
Match-fixing profits 
 
Match-fixing in Greek football has attracted significant media attention over the past few decades (Elefthero-
typia, 2013a), with two major scandals involving numerous professional football clubs revealed, resulting in 
legal prosecutions and even the imprisonment of club presidents and owners. The most recent scandal, as 
our analysis of the EYP (2011) data suggests, involved numerous actors of Greek football, including club 
presidents/owners, football players, referees, bookmakers, illegal agents (intermediates betting on behalf of 
other actors), enforcers (personal protection and intimidation intermediaries hired by the Presidents/owners), 
football managers and player agents. These actors were part of numerous, flexible networks of varying size, 
which allowed for match-fixing to be "organised". These webs were formed on the basis of both long-term 
and short-term relationships, which were incentivised by either the promise of reward or threat: 
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If you do this for me, I'll take good care of you. I'll tell you which match to bet on and you're going to 
earn good money. I'll even fix you up with my guy who can do the betting for you. 
 
If you don't do it, I'll make sure the only match you ref for is the local school's match. 
 
Bearing in mind both the number of individuals involved in the scandal and their direct involvement with the 
Greek football industry, as well as the fact that financial profit was both the incentive and the result of match-
fixing, the financial implications of match-fixing are rather significant. Notably, the unreported large amounts 
of money earned by illegal betting are impossible to be accounted for and, therefore, are not taxed. There is, 
of course, an irony here - these funds are not "clean", but, provided nobody matches their cash expenditures 
with their declared income, it is not risky not to launder the funds. 
Another issue that we came across from the examination of the National Intelligence Agency's wiretapped 
conversations is that not all individuals involved with Greek football would fit the same profile of the powerful 
and dangerous "gangster-like" criminal. In fact, one could say that they tend to fall under two very distinctive 
categories - the "powerful" and the "pushover". The former category includes the individuals who are often 
described as the ones "pulling the strings", the ones with the ability and power to influence the current and 
possibly the future state of the sport, with direct influence not only on one club but a number of them through 
their influence on the latter "pushover" category. This latter category is mainly populated by presidents/ own-
ers, who might also appear to be dangerous - their power, however, is limited to the microcosm of the club 
(the people employed by or connected to the club). Their overall actions are often the result of the influence 
or directions they receive from the "powerful" category. That being said, the presidents/owners in both cate-
gories tend to result in the same practices as far as financial criminal activities are concerned. 
 
Discussion 
 
A number of observations can be made from our findings. Overall, the account that emerges from our exami-
nation does not vindicate the heavy emphasis that orthodox accounts of "organised crime" place on charac-
teristics, such as rigid organisation, coordination, hierarchy and so on, in the commission of criminal activities 
(financial and other) within football. Rather, our findings are consistent with financial crimes committed within 
football, as criminal activities being less robust from an organisational viewpoint, carried out by individuals or 
clusters of individuals that assemble on the basis of opportunity rather than authority. 
Issues around financial crimes within football clubs must be located within the overall football-related context 
in the country, which is, of course, an extension of the general financial, entrepreneurial and political land-
scape in the country. First, Greek football clubs are structured differently in comparison to most European 
ones regarding their ownership and administration. All clubs participating in the top two national divisions, 
Super League and Football League, are privately owned, with their main shareholder keeping an active role 
in the everyday running of the club. The shareholder is often voted by the Board of Administration in the role 
of the "President of the club" who, in most cases, acts as the equivalent of the CEO or the Chairman. In 
some occasions, the elected president is not the shareholder but a person acting on behalf of the main 
shareholder, representing their interests, while managing both playing and non-playing aspects of the foot-
ball club. Although a fit and proper test has been passed as a law of the Greek Government in 1999, as men-
tioned earlier, it is currently not actively applied, allowing for anyone to be involved in the administration of 
the sport. 
Second, the general enormous financial pressures that most Greek football clubs (even the traditionally pow-
erful ones) face in the current entrepreneurial and financial landscape of the country. One of the reasons for 
the financial hardship of football clubs, among others, is the reduced attendance in the Greek stadia with an 
average of 4,328 spectators per Super League football match according to Super League data (Koumbis, 
2013), which data are those taken account of when appealing for sympathetic treatment. Though these data 
might not be accurate, for reasons given in this paper, the order of magnitude is likely to be about right and 
gives an idea of the scale of the "real" problem. 
Related to the above is that the "outcome uncertainty" within the Greek football league has reached extreme 
low levels, causing significant competitive imbalance among the clubs. This imbalance led not only to the 
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creation of "big" and "small" teams, as Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) suggest, but also to the formation of 
"rich" and "poor" clubs. As Schmidt and Berri (2001) note, because the performance on the field in profes-
sional competitive sports has a direct impact on their financial income, the gap between these two groups is 
affected by the competitive balance or imbalance of the league or competition. The minimised outcome un-
certainty in Greek football led to high levels of competitive imbalance within the professional leagues of the 
sport, leading to the creation of "rich" and "poor" clubs, with the gap between these two categories being wid-
ened year after year. Another way to underline this competitive imbalance within the league would be to ex-
amine the level of probability of determining the winner of the league (Buzzacchi et al., 2004). Taking into 
consideration that the Greek Championship has been won by the same club 16 times within the last 18 
years, outcome uncertainty has reached an extreme low level in Greek football, with the Super League often 
being characterised as a "monopoly" (Eleftherotypia, 2013b). 
Within this context, and although we do not claim that we are in the position to offer an exhaustive range of 
motivations for financial crime within football clubs, we can identify two different types of actors: the ones that 
commit financial crimes simply because of personal greed in the presence of opportunity and in the absence 
of substantial regulation in the (Greek) football industry. "Opportunity to commit a crime in a business or 
company environment", Padgett (2015, p. 201) argues, "is a situation where an offender circumvents internal 
financial controls or takes advantage of a weakness in those controls". 
The second type is the people who commit these types of financial crimes as a response to the ferocious dy-
namics in the football industry. Within the formation of this financial imbalance among clubs that we men-
tioned above, the second type of financial criminal resembles to what Antonopoulos and Hall (2014, p. 331) 
have called the: 
 
 
[...] "reluctant criminal undertaker": the pragmatist who simply seeks to "get things done" on behalf of 
the interests of the self, and according to the logic of the market's "dark heart", in the midst of "inher-
ited" or artificially created circumstances, no matter how brutally competitive and unforgiving they 
might be. 
 
Whereas Antonopoulos and Hall's (2014) "reluctant criminal undertaker" is the product of pre-emptive fear of 
losing one's finger-hold on the economy, the people committing financial crime within football clubs are the 
product of the pre-emptive fear of the club "not making it" and losing their finger-hold in the football industry. 
In this sense, football-related financial crime in Greece appears to be an integral part of a symbiosis between 
personal greed, aspirations and needs, as well as ferocious market dynamics in the world of football that dis-
advantage most of the football clubs, their players and their officials who now operate as small and medium 
entrepreneurs cutting corners in the absence of substantial regulation. 
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Notes 
 
1
     English Premier League, Spanish La Liga, Italian Serie A, German Bundesliga and French Ligue 1. 
 
2
     Hereafter, referred to as EYP (2011). 
 
3
     Most sports newspapers are tied to the major football clubs and tend not to have an objective stance. 
 
4
     Due to the Greek taxation system and the way in which professional football players declare their income (often by estab-
lishing a company that presents the players' income as the company's revenue in order to have a smaller taxation rate), it is 
highly unlikely for the actual amount paid by the club to be traced back. Essentially, the expenses claimed by the clubs are not 
correlated with the income tax declaration of the individual player. 
 
5
     According to the Greek accounting system, an account can be created for money owed that is unlikely to be collected. 
 
